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NOTES
ARRESTING WIFE BATTERERS: A GOOD BEGINNING
TO STOPPING A PERVASIVE PROBLEM
The violent crime of domestic abuse' persists in American society.
Wife battering has existed throughout history, at times accepted, often
ignored, and, until recently, typically excused.2 Studies carried out by
social workers can provide useful insights into the dynamics that cause
battering and the "learned helplessness" that results.3 However, the
traditional response of police, prosecutors, and judges often traps women
in abusive relationships in which they are defenseless.4
Over the last decade, ten states have instituted mandatory arrest poli-
cies.5 Such laws, specificly addressing domestic violence crimes, require
police officers to make an arrest if probable cause exists that an individ-
ual either has committed a misdemeanor or has violated a restraining
order. Most states, however, retain laws calling for arrest when probable
cause exists that a felony has been committed. Since most domestic vio-
lence assaults are classified as misdemeanors, traditional law leaves the
decision of whether to arrest solely to the investigating officer. This often
leaves the woman with little protection.6 Studies indicate, however, that
arresting the batterer and immediately removing him from the home can
significantly reduce the chance of his again becoming abusive.7
Left to their own discretion, many police, prosecutors, and judges do
not view domestic assault as a substantial problem.' Historically, many
have not considered it a crime.9 Hampered by stereotypes about the
rights of men in marriage and the privacy of the marital relationship, the
judicial system often responds ineffectively to protect battered women.
1. This Note uses "domestic violence," "wife battering," and "domestic abuse" synony-
mously; they are defined as an assault or battery perpetrated upon a woman by her sexual partner.
The term "sexual partner" and the terms "husband" and "wife" are used to encompass relationships
in which the man and woman are married, divorced, cohabiting, or dating.
2. See infra note 56.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 26-28.
4. See infra notes 48-85 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 158.
6. See infra notes 149-58 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 161-70 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 48-85 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
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The entire judicial system can become more accessible to victims of do-
mestic violence if states and municipalities provide careful guidelines for
police response. 10
This Note argues that solely through mandatory arrest laws does the
judicial system classify wife battering for what it is: a crime. Part I dis-
cusses the causes and nature of the battering relationship and its preva-
lence in American society. Part II critiques the traditional response of
the judicial system to wife battering. Part III outlines recent cases aimed
at stimulating more substantial police response. Part IV reviews legisla-
tive efforts to deal with domestic violence. Finally, Part V concludes that
only through the mandatory arrest of batterers can the judicial system
respond adequately to the crime of domestic abuse and discourage its
acceptance by our society.
I. THE BATTERING RELATIONSHIP
A. The Battered Woman
Estimates vary as to the extent of domestic abuse in the United States,
but there is little doubt that it is widespread. Evidence suggests that one
in every six American women is battered at some point in her life; t1 at
least two million women are subjected to physical abuse every year.12
Battering occurs at all socio-economic levels. One study indicates that
white, educated, upper-middle class women and poor and minority wo-
men are equally likely to be victims. 3
Strong social and psychological forces tie battered women to the men
who abuse them. 4 The battered woman commonly holds traditional no-
10. See infra notes 161-89 and accompanying text.
11. Finesmith, Police Response to Battered Women: A Critique and Proposals for Reform, 14
SETON HALL 74, 77 (1983).
12. Id. at 79. According to one report, approximately 1350 women were killed by their boy-
friends, spouses, or ex-spouses in 1985. Meier, Battered Justice, WASH. MONTHLY, May 1987, at 37.
13. Finesmith, supra note 11, at 79 (citing Eisenberg & Micklow, The Assaulted Wife: "Catch
22" Revisited, 3 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 138, 144 (1977)). Similarly, battering is not limited to
specific ages, ethnic groups, or geographical locations. See Eisenberg & Micklow, The Assaulted
Wife: "Catch 22" Revisited, 3 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 138, 159 (1977); Buzawa & Buzawa, Legisla-
tive Responses to the Problem of Domestic Violence in Michigan, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 859, 860 (1979).
Poor battered women are more likely to come to the attention of the public because they, more
than middle- and upper-class battered women, seek the help of government officials and battered
women's shelters. Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering: Understanding the
Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. RyV. 267, 276 (1985).
14. Waits, supra note 13, at 279.
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tions of marriage and the role of women within the family. 5 She views
the man as head of the household and thinks it her responsibility to pro-
vide for her husband's happiness. She further believes he has the right to
punish her violently for her perceived failures. 6 Her success as a wife
depends on her ability to control his violence. A woman finding herself
unable to control this violence experiences self-blame and a deepened
sense of failure. 17
Battered women often are unable to escape from abusive relationships
without outside help."8 A battered woman also may deny that the abuse
occurs. 9 The woman, ashamed of the abuse, denies the reality to herself,
thereby avoiding acknowledgment of the reality to others.2 ° This denial
also allows the woman to keep her family together, a goal of overriding
importance to her.21
Practical considerations can also serve to bind the woman to her hus-
band. In battering relationships the man characteristically dominates the
woman in all aspects of the relationship, particularly in the area of family
finances.22 The battered woman often has little or no independent or
15. Id. at 280. The battered woman judges herself by her capacity to be a good wife and
mother, viewing the relationship between herself and her husband as part of a realm of private family
life of no concern to outsiders. L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 31 (1979). According to the
National Crime Survey, a prime motivation of 49% of the women who did not report domestic
violence was their belief that battering is a personal matter. P. LANGAN & C. INNES, PREVENTING
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS, SPECIAL REPORT 1 (1986).
16. Waits, supra note 13, at 281. Battered women commonly doubt their capacity to be good
cooks, housekeepers, or lovers. They may, however, feel more capable and competent in their activi-
ties outside the home. But it is the traditional wifely functions that are most important to the bat-
tered woman in her self-assessment. L. WALKER, supra note 15, at 33-34.
17. Waits, supra note 13, at 281. Battered women characteristically have low self-esteem. L.
WALKER, supra note 15, at 32.
18. Indeed, one of the most commonly asked questions concerning battered women is "why do
they stay?" Gelles, Abused Wiver Why Do they Stay?, in ABUSE OF WOMEN: LEGISLATION, RE-
PORTING, AND PREVENTION 13 (. Costa ed. 1983).
19. See Waits, supra note 13, at 281. Such denial is especially troubling given that the severity
of battering varies. More serious assaults may involve kicking, choking, breaking bones, burning,
raping, and mutilating. When the woman is pregnant or the mother of young children, the violence
often becomes more acute. L. WALKER, supra note 15, at 105.
20. This denial often results in the battered woman being incapable of reaching out to those
who could provide her with help. Waits, supra note 13, at 281.
21. Id. at 282.
22. Not only does the woman not have access to the family finances, but she often knows little
or nothing about them. Indeed, the batterer commonly puts joint assets in his name alone. J. FLEM-
ING, STOPPING WIFE ABUSE: A GUIDE TO THE EMOTIONAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND LEGAL IMPLI-
CATIONS FOR THE ABUSED WOMAN AND THOSE HELPING HER 84 (1979).
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accessible resources sufficient to enable her to leave the common dwelling
and provide for her children. 23 Her lack of control over family assets
may also lead to an inability to obtain legal advice.24 Even if a woman
overcomes these obstacles and attempts to leave, she nevertheless may
face more physical abuse from her husband.25
Many battered women develop a condition termed "learned helpless-
ness."2 6 Symptomatic of this is the battered woman's feeling that her life
is out of her control. The longer the relationship, the more this percep-
tion may become real.27 Repeated batterings erode her sense of strength
and she ultimately becomes passive.2" The abused woman holds herself
responsible for the battering and becomes unable to escape even though
that may be the only option she can control in the relationship.29 Fi-
nally, many battered women love their husbands and endure the abuse in
the hope that the abuser will change.30
23. See Brown, Battered Women and the Temporary Restraining Order, 10 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
REP. 261, 262 (1988); Endicott, The Criminality of Wife Assault, 45 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 355,
358 (1987). The woman who chooses to leave faces grave alternatives. Welfare may be insufficient
to support her and her children and, should she find adequate employment, child care is sometimes
unavailable. NATIONAL CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, INC., LEGAL ADVOCACY FOR
BATTERED WOMEN 6 (1982) [hereinafter NATONAL CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW].
Furthermore, should relocation be necessary to avoid the abuse, leaving her community can be eco-
nomically and emotionally dificult. Meier, supra note 12, at 39.
24. Brown, supra note 23, at 262.
25. Battered women spend much of their lives trying to "read" their husbands and interpret the
signs. Many know that their husband will attempt to track them down should they attempt to leave.
NATIONAL CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, supra note 23, at 6. See also Waits, supra note
13, at 283.
26. L. WALKER, supra note 15, at 47.
27. Waits, supra note 13, at 283 (describing how learned helplessness progressively deepens).
28. L. WALKER, supra note 15.
29. Waits, supra note 13, at 283. Battering relationships create a cycle of psychological degra-
dation. The batterer beats his partner and she feels unable to control his violence. This increases her
feelings of inadequacy and loss of control, leaving her trapped in a violent relationship. Further
beatings occur, and her sense of helplessness grows. Id. at 282-83. Some battered women strike
back against their abusers; data strongly suggests that women who kill their partners in many cases
have been abused previously by that person. Mercy & Saltzman, Fatal Violence Among Spouses in
the United States, 1976-85, 79 AM. J. Pus. HEALTH 595, 597 (1989). For further description of the
cycle of abuse, see infra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
One study shows that the frequency of the violence may affect whether the woman will seek
outside aid. Of women who were physically battered only once during their marriages, only 42%
sought intervention. On the other hand, 100% of the women who had been struck at least once a
month appealed for outside help. Gelles, supra note 18, at 17.
30. Endicott, supra note 23, at 359.
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B. The Batterer
The batterer often possesses characteristics very similar to those of the
woman he abuses.3" He has low self-esteem.32 He also usually subscribes
to traditional notions of family in which the man is "king in his castle."33
Like his victim, the batterer denies his violence, to himself and to
others.34
The batterer tends to be overly jealous and protective of his wife.35 He
sees her time spent with children, relatives, and friends, and at work as a
threat; his desire to control her life then grows.36 Batterers commonly
grew up in abusive families and may have learned such behavior from
watching their fathers beat their mothers or from being beaten them-
selves. 37  Despite the devastation batterers create in their homes, those
outside the family often see them as likeable individuals. Because batter-
ers often feel remorse for their behavior, they try all the harder to deny
the destruction they cause.38
31. Waits, supra note 13, at 286. See also L. WALKER, supra note 15, at 36.
32. L. WALKER, supra note 15, at 36. The batterer's macho exterior often belies his internal
feelings. Consumed with insecurity, the batterer feels that only through violence and intimidation
will his wife do as he wishes. Waits, supra note 13, at 286. Like battered women, batterers believe
wives are responsible for catering to the needs and whims of their husbands. Id.
33. Waits, supra note 13, at 286.
34. L. WALKER, supra note 15, at 36.
35. Id. at 37. The batterer, commonly emotionally secluded from everyone other than his wife,
becomes heavily dependent on her. This dependence may lead to a pathological jealousy of anything
or anyone else that touches her life. Waits, supra note 13, at 287.
36. L. WALKER, supra note 15, at 73-74.
37. Id. at 38. Batterers learn while growing up in abusive homes that violence in the home is
natural and that physically stronger family members have the right to beat weaker ones. The bat-
terer usually is not violent with those outside the family. He understands that in situations outside
the home he will face punishment for assaulting someone. His wife, however, can rely on no such
deterrent, unless aided by an outside party. Waits, supra note 13, at 288.
Children of batterers run a strong risk of participating in family violence as adults. Id. at 298.
The violent home becomes a "role model" for these children. Gelles, supra note 18, at 18-19. Some
suggest that little girls who witness domestic violence are more likely to marry violent men, while
women who did not grow up in violent homes are likely to be less tolerant of domestic violence and
often seek intervention. Id.
38. Ironically, the guilt the batterer feels stimulates his need to find external rationales for his
behavior. He thus often comes to blame his wife for his behavior, Waits, supra note 13, at 289-91,
even though close study of battering relationships reveals that the woman is not the cause of the
violence. Events over which the battered woman has no control may trigger an episode of violence.
She cannot control her partner, nor can she fully predict the degree of violence that will ensue.
Because his violence will not stop until outside forces intervene, early intervention provides the best
hope for permanently terminating the abuse. Id. at 278.
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C. The Pattern of Abuse
Commonly, the battered woman is unaware prior to marriage that her
partner is abusive. 39 A woman struck for the first time reacts in disbelief
and anger.' The batterer may be repentant, asking for forgiveness and
promising that the violence will not happen again.41 The woman loves
him and, therefore, believes his apologies and considers the incident an
aberration.42 But, the battering continues and a cycle begins.43
Psychologist Lenore Walker identifies a battering cycle with three dis-
tinct phases: 1) the tension-building period; 2) the severe battering inci-
dent; and 3) the quiet, loving reprieve.' During the first phase, relatively
minor battering incidents occur, while the woman struggles to halt the
escalation of tension.4" The battering increases in frequency, with the
relationship between the couple growing more strained. Finally the
phase two severe battering incident occurs.' After the severe battering,
the batterer commonly becomes loving and contrite and the couple may
39. J. FLEMING, supra note 22, at 94. The woman often is ignorant of his violence until they
move in together. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 95.
43. Battering is usually recurrent, its severity increasing during the relationship, Lerman, Me.
diation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 75 (1984). The 1978 to 1982 National Crime Survey showed that once a
man abused his partner, the chances of additional violence were high. The study showed that for six
months following a battering incident an estimated 32% of the women were abused again. P. LAN-
GAN & C. INNES, supra note 15.
44. L. VALKER, supra note 15, at 55.
45. Id. at 56-59. When minor batterings occur, the woman is conciliatory. She becomes com-
pliant, seeking to avert his violence and blaming herself when unable to do so. She does not show
anger for fear of provoking more violence. Instead, she denies her anger and rationalizes that she is
to blame for the attacks. She minimizes lesser attacks knowing he is capable of much greater vio-
lence. Id. These isolated batterings escalate. The woman often denies this escalation because of her
fear of the inevitable second phase. The batterer is aware that his abuse is inappropriate yet his
violence increases as he strives to continue his control over the woman. Id. at 57-58. During this
phase a delicate balance is achieved. The woman strives to control the factors that might trigger her
husband's violence, particularly the behavior of other family members. But the tension gradually
and inevitably grows. The battering incidents occur with more frequency, and the man becomes
more possessive and controlling. The woman's defense mechanisms that worked to stabilize the
relationship earlier in the cycle are no longer effective and the precarious equilibrium is lost. Id. at
58-59.
46. Id. at 59-64. The second phase is short, lasting usually between 2 and 24 hours. It is
characterized by an uncontrollable explosion. At this point, both parties acknowledge that the bat-
terer's rage is beyond control. The batterer begins with the intention of teaching the woman a lesson
rather than with an intent to harm. However, when he finally stops, frequently the woman has been
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss3/7
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experience a period of closeness before the cycle begins again.'
II. THE TRADITIONAL LEGAL RESPONSE
A. The Police
Battered women often do not call the police when battering is immi-
nent or occurring because they perceive that the police are ineffective in
stopping the abuse.48 Often a police officer will only quiet the batterer,
ascertain whether the woman requires medical care, and try to persuade
the man and the woman to end the fighting.49 Frequently the battering
temporarily stops after the police leave, but in some cases the battering
resumes, sometimes with even greater intensity.5 °
seriously beaten. An outside event or the man's own feelings generally preciptates the incident. Id.
at 59-60.
Sometimes, in anticipation of this phase, the woman will provoke the incident in order to get it
over, thus bringing on phase three, in which the batterer becomes calm. Often, she will not realize
that she has purposefully provoked the incident. Id.
47. Id. at 65-70. During this period, the batterer is extremely sorry for his actions and continu-
ously begs the woman for her forgiveness. He assures her that he will never hurt her again, believing
himself that the battering will cease. The batterer often seeks the aid of other family members and
friends in convincing the woman not to leave him. Commonly, he promises to seek counseling. The
batterer's loving behavior and assurances feed the delusions of the battered woman who wants to
believe her husband will change. The emergence of his insecurities also moves her. He preys on her
traditional notions of marriage: "for better or for worse." During this phase the couple temporarily
reforges their sense of partnership. However, soon the tensions of daily life begin again to take their
toll and slowly the couple moves back into phase one. Id.
48. Women do not initiate judicial procedures when there is reason to expect inequitable treat-
ment. Believing that the criminal justice system will arrive at an unjust outcome, a battered woman
will not look to the police for help. As a result, cases do not go to trial, and a violent crime is
perpetuated. A. BOYLAND & N. TAUB, ADULT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: CONSTITUTIONAL, LEGIS-
LATIVE AND EQUITABLE ISSUES 209 (1981). One writer explains that when the police, "act[ing] as
gatekeepers to the criminal justice system," do not respond adequately, victims will be reluctant to
seek criminal charges or cooperate if the police file a complaint. L. LERMAN, PROSECUTION OF
SPOUSE ABUSE: INNOVATIONS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 119 (1983).
49. L. WALKER, supra note 15, at 206. The police most often tell the battered woman that they
can do nothing and then leave. Oppenlander, Coping or Copping Out, 20 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 456
(1982). In one case, the officers neither arrested the batterer-despite believing there was probable
cause to do so--nor explained to the woman what steps she could take to have her batterer arrested.
Although it appeared that the batterer had just assaulted the woman, the officers' primary concern
was with persuading the batterer to leave the house. Id. at 460-61. This incident is not uncommon.
One study showed that in 10% of the domestic assaults examined, the police reported not arresting
the batterer despite legal cause. Id. at 461.
50. One study showed that there was no greater likelihood for additional violence when the
police were called. According to the study, there apparently was actually a reduced chance of fur-
ther violence when the police were notified. P. LANGAN & C. INNES, supra note 15, at 4. Married
women who called the police were 62% less likely to experience further battering. Id. The authors
of the study proposed that these decreases may be due to good judgement of the victim as to whether
Washington University Open Scholarship
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When the police answer domestic violence calls they often are unable
to make arrests under existing state law."1 Beyond this, however, the
opinions of individual officers, as well as general police department poli-
cies, also may explain police inaction.
Another possible source of police 2 reluctance to deal with these cases
is the traditional belief that wife battering simply is not a crime, 53 or at
best, not a relatively important crime.54  Some officers hold the tradi-
tional notion that the relationship between husband and wife lies within a
realm of family privacy in which police should not intrude.55 Others
or not the particular batterer is likely to continue after the call to police. The women who know the
beating will continue do not call. Id. Even so, if the woman calls police, it is usually during phase
two. L. WALKER, supra note 15, at 64. See supra note 46. Because of the uncontrolled nature of
this period, police attempts at mediation generally will be unsuccessful. Some battered women, fear-
ful of further abuse, frequently oppose the police if they intervene during this stage-at least when a
third party has called the police. The woman attempts to show the batterer her loyalty to him in
order to prevent further abuse. Some battered women explain that if they knew the police would
arrest their husbands, they would not oppose the police. L. WALKER, supra note 15, at 64.
51. Meier, supra note 12 at 38. Existing state law often ties the hands of the police. Most state
law authorizes arrest if the officer actually witnesses the battering incident or a judge issues an arrest
warrant. See infra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
52. This applies equally to prosecutors and judges. See infra notes 173-76 and accompanying
text.
53. Meier, supra note 12, at 38. The justice system's failure to treat battering as criminal often
leads battered women to see the police as being allied with their husbands. Eppler, Battered Women
and the Equal Protection Clause" Will the Constitution Help Them When the Police Won't?, 95 YALE
L.J. 788, 790-91 (1986).
54. Chicago Police Captain Raymond Risley explained this prioritization:
We don't send a lot of wife beaters to jail. We don't have a lot of space because the system
is putting away those who do what society considers more serious crimes - like crimes
against property or two strangers assaulting each other. Wife beatings is low on the list of
priorities for prison terms.
Blodgett, Violence in the Home, A.B.A.J., May 1987, at 66 (statement of Chicago Police Captain
Risley). Pennsylvania State Rep. Lois Hagarty voices a similar conclusion. As an assistant district
attorney, she found that "there was very serious abuse but the sanctions were not too serious. Noth-
ing about the cases was treated seriously." Id. at 67-68 (quoting Rep. Hagarty).
Studies show police respond more slowly to domestic violence calls then to disputes between unre-
lated parties. This is apparently due to a general sense among officers that, given some time, the
parties will calm down and resolve their "spat." Oppenlander, supra note 49, at 453.
55. Oppenlander, supra note 49, at 459. This attitude is based on a traditionally perceived need
to ensure family privacy. See supra note 15. Such blind adherence to outdated notions of privacy
creates nonsensical results. Family privacy is important in that it allows for individual autonomy
and choice, and mutual support in personal matters. This purpose is in no way furthered when
family privacy prevents intervention and thus promotes assault. The law behaves arbitrarily when a
zone of family privacy is defined and made impervious to attack, regardless of other interest which
need protection. The law must not blindly protect "privacy;" rather, it must foster those values that
make privacy desirable. Endicott, supra note 23, at 359. Clearly, domestic harmony needs no pro-
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believe in the antiquated right of men to "discipline" their wives.5 6 Ad-
ditionally, many police officers, trained in the use of physical force, can
relate to the batterer's use of force to control his wife.57
Beyond personal prejudices and socialization, police view involvement
in domestic disputes as inherently more dangerous than other calls. A
recent FBI Uniform Crime Report suggests, however, that police fears
are exaggerated.58 The study showed that domestic calls are among the
tection after a man has battered his wife. Note, The Battered Wife-The Legal System Attempts to
Help, 48 U. CIN. L. Rav. 419, 433 (1979) (authored by Renee Birnbaum).
56. Throughout much of history, the law of most cultures gave men the right to hit their wives.
Note, Section 1983 and Domestic Violence: A Solution to the Problem of Police Officers' Inaction, 30
B.C.L. REV. 1357, 1358 (1989) (authored by Gary Bishop). Early Roman law gave the husband
absolute dominion over his wife and would not question the killing of a woman by her husband.
Stedman, Right of Husband to Chastise Wife, 3 VA. L. REG. 241 (1917). British and American
societies viewed women as their husband's "chattel." The husband was authorized to beat his wife
with a stick no thicker than his thumb, thus the expression "rule of thumb." Blodgett, supra note
54, at 67. A husband was within his rights as long as he only "moderately chastised" his wife. Id. at
67.
During the mid-1800s, courts began repudiating the "chastisement" right. Finesmith, supra note
11, at 80. See Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143, 146-47 (1871) (husband does not have privilege to
batter his wife). By the end of the 19th century, most American courts had criminalized battering.
Although the law no longer condoned battering, only wealthy women could afford to take their cases
to court. If they did, they likely would suffer social embarrassment and criticism. Finesmith, supra
note 11, at 80. Prosecutors did not make a concerted effort to prosecute batterers until the 1970s. L.
LERMAN, supra note 48, at 16.
Tort law also failed to provide substantial relief to battered women. For a long time, the inter-
spousal immunity doctrine prohibited husbands or wives from suing one another for intentional or
negligent personal or property torts. Note, supra note 55, at 420. While women acquired the right
to sue for property torts in the mid-1800's, many courts continued to deny recovery for personal
torts through the end of the 19th century and most of the 20th century. W. KEETON, D. DOBnS, R.
KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 902 (5th ed. 1984). See also Thompson v.
Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963);
Campbell v. Campbell, 145 W. Va. 245, 114 S.E.2d 406 (1960).
Today, a majority of states allow intraspousal suits in most circumstances, including personal
torts. A sizable minority of states, however, adhere to an absolute immunity between husband and
wife in actions for personal torts. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra at 903.
See also Alfree v. Alfree, 410 A.2d 161 (Del.), appeal dismissed, 446 U.S. 931 (1979); Raisen v.
Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352 (Fla.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1979); Bonkowsky v. Bonkowsky, 69 Ohio
St. 2d 152, 431 N.E.2d 998, cert denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982).
57. Pastoor, Police Training and the Effectiveness of Minnesota "Domestic Abuse" Laws, 2 L. &
INEQUALITY 557, 562 (1984). Officers, predominantly male, are trained to use force and physical
coercion. This makes some male police officers more empathetic towards batterers who also use
force to dominate and coerce. Id. One officer suggests that a substantial number of police batter
their own wives. O'Reilly, Wife Beating: The Silent Crime, TIME, Sept. 5, 1983, at 24 (statement of
Detroit Executive Police Chief James Bannon).
58. L. SHERMAN, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, NA-
TIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CRIME FILE STUDY GUIDE 2.
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least likely calls to lead to an officer's death or injury.59 Furthermore,
police injuries have decreased in states where mandatory arrest policies
exist.6°
Police are also reluctant to answer domestic violence calls because of
problems they face in attempting to gather the requisite proof of abuse,
compounded by the usual paucity of witnesses in cases of domestic vio-
lence.61 Furthermore, most jurisdictions classify battering as a misde-
meanor and bar the police from effecting an arrest unless they witness the
battering or have a court-issued arrest warrant.62 Those few witnesses to
59. Id. Disturbance calls reported to the FBI traditionally were assumed to be domestic vio-
lence incidents. J. GARNER & E. CLEMMER, DANGER TO POLICE IN DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES -
A NEW LOOK, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE,
RESEARCH IN BRIEF 2 (1986). However, a recent analysis of these disturbance calls demonstrates
that many involved bar fights, the situation in which the largest number of officers were killed. This
suggests that the number of officers killed responding to family violence calls was much lower than
earlier assumed, lower even than the number of officers accidentally shot by their colleagues. L.
SHERMAN, supra note 58, at 2. In 1982, the FBI received reports of 92 officers feloniously killed. Of
these, only 8% lost their lives answering domestic violence calls, while 12% died responding to other
types of "disturbances." J. GARNER & E. CLEMMER, supra, at 2.
In the past, police training emphasized the danger of answering domestic violence calls. In ac-
cordance with this new data, police training should now emphasize more effective responses to fam-
ily violence and focus greater attention on the victims' needs. Id. at 5.
60. Mandatory arrest laws can actually protect the police by providing advance notice to all of
the parties involved regarding the consequences of battering. Recent Development, Mandatory
Arrestfor Domestic Violence, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 213, 221 (1988) (authored by Sara Buel).
61. Police often are unwilling to make arrests. They believe that arrests typically are worthless
since the chances are slight that prosecution will ensue. The police usually expect that, the day after
the assault, the victim may no longer wish to pursue a judicial remedy and will withhold coopera-
tion. L. SHERMAN, supra note 58, at 1. See infra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
Police also are aware that batterers probably will not be charged. In turn, prosecutors' reluctance
to file charges may be based on their familiarity with the judges before whom they will appear.
Courts, frequently hesitant to hear wife abuse cases, are sometimes even visibly hostile to abused
women. Judges have even made statements such as "What did you do to make him hit you?" to
battered women before them. Blodgett, supra note 54, at 69 (statement of Paul King, former presid-
ing judge of the Dorchester, Massachusetts district court). See also infra notes 175-78 and accompa-
nying text.
62. L. SHERMAN, supra note 58, at 2. In the past, officers based their decision to arrest largely
on the victim's willingness to file charges. Evidence that the batterer committed an assault was
insufficient. Today, however, probable cause standards for domestic violence are treated more like
arrest standards for other crimes. The Law Enforcement Training Project of the Victim Services
Agency of New York City, State Legislation Providing for Law Enforcement Response to Family
Violence, 12 RESPONSE 6, 8 (1989) [hereinafter Law Enforcement Training Project]. However, po-
lice frequently still apply a higher standard of probable cause to trigger arrest in domestic battering
cases than in other crimes. Injuries that they would consider sufficient cause for arrest between
nonrelated combatants usually do not suffice when the parties are married or dating. L. LERMAN,
PROTECTION OF SPOUSE ABUSE, supra note 48, at 25. The disparity in treatment is illogical. The
law has been unable to eradicate completely many crimes. Yet, that never has been a reason for the
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the battering often are children.63
Police department policies, or the lack thereof, compound the afore-
mentioned problems. One survey that covered the years 1984 and 1985
showed that almost fifty percent of the police departments surveyed
failed to provide policy guidelines or training concerning domestic vio-
lence.' Although this situation shows signs of improving,65 where it still
exists it creates a system of complete discretion by default.66 States with
little or no legislation leave the police even more discretion.67 Where
policies exist, they commonly do not give domestic violence priority
equal with other crimes.68
The general non-interventionist policy pervading most police depart-
ments gained academic acceptance in the early 1970s when social work
theories offering alternatives to punishment became the preferred method
of dealing with certain crimes.6 9 Academics viewed mediation and on-
the-scene counseling as more effective than arrest." Today, most observ-
police to condone lawlessness. This outlook applies equally to wifebeating. Waits, supra note 13, at
300.
63. L. LERMAN, supra note 48, at 22.
64. Cohn, Changing the Domestic Violence Policies of Urban Police Department" Impact of the
Minneapolis Experiment, 10/4 RESPONSE 22 (1987). Typically, police training focused on the dan-
gers to the police of answering domestic calls. See supra note 59.
65. Cohn, supra note 64. By 1986, a subsequent survey showed a marked change. Only 35% of
departments continued to permit complete discretion, while 44% showed an inclination towards
arrest. Id.
66. Furthermore, there is a chance of unequal application of the law where there is wide police
discretion. Officers arrest a disproportionate number of men of color, while showing reluctance to
arrest batterers who are affluent and white. Recent Development, supra note 60, at 224.
67. In such jurisdictions, police officers appear to have complete discretion in deciding how to
handle domestic violence calls. Given the unpredictable nature of such a system, battered women
cannot always be assured of adequate police intervention should they take the possibly dangerous
step of calling for help. Finesmith, supra note 11, at 88.
Where they exist, and where there is no governing legislation, police department policies tend to
prefer mediation. Officers are urged to arrest only as a last resort. Id. at 89. Such guidelines appar-
ently offer no more protection for the battered woman than in jurisdictions in which officers have
complete discretion. Arrests are no more frequent, and victims are faced with the same unpredict-
ability characteristic of full discretion jurisdictions. Id. at 91. Batterers take advantage of this un-
predictability and the small likelihood of arrest. Id. at 92.
68. Brown, supra note 23, at 263.
69. Meier, supra note 12, at 39.
70. Professionals preferred mediation as a method of helping families resolve their conflicts
informally, without resorting to intrusive court battles. The prevalent belief was that mediation
would improve communication between the couple. Lerman, supra note 43, at 61.
Officers tend to react differently in cases of domestic violence than they do when faced with nonre-
lated combatants. In wife battering cases, the police will often attempt to settle an argument or urge
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ers discount this in situations involving violence.7' They view the justice
system, criminal and civil, 72 as the principle means of holding batterers
responsible for their crimes and of ensuring justice and protection for the
victims of abuse.73
one of the parties to leave the premises, a method they are unlikely to employ in other situations.
Oppenlander, supra note 49, at 460.
71. Meier, supra note 12, at 39. A party's fear of the other party in mediation may undermine
independent decision making. Lerman, supra note 43, at 73. Nonetheless, some advocates continue
to adhere to the mediation model and to maintain that processing the conflict through the judicial
system is inappropriate. They believe that both parties share some responsibility in cases of abuse.
Id. at 74. Supporters of a law enforcement model disagree, suggesting that only the batterer is
responsible for his abusive behavior. Thus, the only appropriate remedy requires him to take respon-
sibility for his violence. Id. at 75.
Many advocates for battered women do not believe the goal of intervention necessarily should be
to keep the family together. Their primary concern is to protect the victim. Id. at 79. Advocates of
this position encourage public exposure of the problem by using the court system. The courts pro-
vide an effective means of holding the batterer responsible for his own behavior, while assuring that
society will punish such criminal behavior. Id. at 83.
When conflicts dealing with violence are mediated, the violence often is not discussed, Thus,
mediation encourages the couple to solve their problems without directly addressing the basic issue
that brought them to the negotiating table in the first place. Id. at 84. While mediation may provide
a means of keeping the marriage together, it ignores the underlying problem of the batterer's vio-
lence. Consequently, it perpetuates violence against the victim. Id. at 85.
Advocates of the law enforcement path are, however, realistic about police intervention. The law
enforcement model is successful only if the police and the prosecutors do their jobs in a competent,
aggressive manner. Otherwise, effective mediation might provide the only successful means of stop-
ping battering. Id. at 98.
72. Every state and the District of Columbia, except Arkansas and New Mexico, provide for
civil orders of protection in domestic violence cases. The civil protection order, available through ex
parte proceedings, commands the batterer immediately to leave the woman alone. Depending on the
circumstances, the order may evict the batterer from the home shared with the victim. It also may
grant the woman temporary custody of the children and enjoin the batterer from any visitation
rights. The order also may direct the batterer to pay for child support or require that the batterer
participate in counseling. Finn, Statutory Authority in the Use and Enforcement of Civil Protection
Orders Against Domestic Abuse, 33 FAM. L.Q. 43 (1989).
Civil orders of protection provide a valuable recourse in situations in which the batterer's action
may not have reached provable criminal proportions. Additionally, many women have no desire to
punish their batterers, but merely want the violence stopped. Id. at 44.
Obviously, civil orders will not prevent a man from killing or seriously injuring a woman when he
is determined to do so. d. at 45. In such cases, only imprisonment will protect the woman. None-
theless, civil orders, when accompanied by police enforcement, can provide effective deterrence in
situations not rising to this level. Like arrest, civil orders impress upon the batterer that there will be
a price to pay. Id. at 45. However, police often underenforce civil orders, despite 13 states having
authorized warrantless arrests for violation of civil orders. Id. at 45.
73. Working to Prevent Mediation of Domestic Violence Cases, 3/1 THE EXCHANGE Fall-Win-
ter 1988-89, at 8. When dealing with domestic violence, the police must ensure the victim's safety.
It is inappropriate for police to inquire into an innocent victim's behavior. Pastoor, supra note 57, at
590.
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B. Prosecutorial Discretion
Even if the police arrest the batterer, prosecution may not ensue. Be-
cause prosecutors have wide discretion,74 the standards for when to pros-
ecute are at least as vague as police arrest criteria.75 It may be that since
the system does not value highly the successful prosecution of batterers,
prosecutors have little incentive to pursue such charges vigorously.76
Charges that prosecutors do press usually are misdemeanors rather than
felonies, no matter how serious the assault." If charges are brought the
likelihood of the case continuing is diminished by the legal responsibili-
ties imposed on the battered woman.
74. American society historically has tolerated wife battering. See supra note 56. This raises
difficult questions in the realm of discretion and domestic violence. Trusting prosecutorial discretion
on behalf of such public interest may be a dubious proposition. Ellis, Prosecutorial Discretion to
Charge in Cases of Spousal Assault: A Dialogue, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 56, 60 (1984).
75. Meier, supra note 12, at 42. One Canadian writer urges prosecutors to be aggressive to
emphasize that society should view battering as a crime and treat it accordingly. The victim must be
treated as a victim, not as a party to the proceedings. Endicott, supra note 23, at 368. Further, the
decision to bring charges should lay with the prosecutor and not the victim. Coercion from the
batterer may prevent a woman from pressing charges. Id. at 368-69.
Prosecutors commonly maintain that domestic violence is a problem for the social service agencies
and not for the criminal courts. L. LERMAN, supra note 48, at 13. Similarly, some judges believe
that the criminal justice system is an inappropriate forum for domestic abuse cases. Eisenberg &
Micklow, supra note 13, at 159.
76. See infra note 85 for a discussion of the pressure on prosecutors. For a discussion of the
effect that an unwillingness to prosecute can have on judges and police, see infra notes 175-78 and
accompanying text.
77. One third of the cases of domestic abuse detected by the National Crime Survey were classi-
fied as felonies, the others were categorized as "simple assault," a misdemeanor in most jurisdictions.
Despite the different categories, many serious cases of assault are classified as misdemeanors. Victim
injury occurs at least as much in misdemeanor assaults as in felonious assaults. In at least half the
cases classified as misdemeanors, the bodily injury was as grave or more so than in 90% of the
domestic abuse cases labeled felonies. P. LANGAN & C. INNEs, supra note 15, at 3.
In many jurisdictions, the difference between a misdemeanor and a felony is the presence of a
weapon in the latter or the extent of the injury. Data from the National Crime Survey suggests that
differentiation between misdemeanor and felonious assaults may have the accidental effect of con-
cealing the true nature of wife abuse in the United States. Id. Thus, in San Diego, misdemeanor
prosecutors handle most of the wife battering cases. Contrary to the general understanding of "mis-
demeanor" crimes, they are given cases in which victims have been choked, shot, stabbed, or
threatened with death. Palermo, An Abuse of Process: Despite Some Reforms, Battered Women Are
Still Mistreated by the Judicial System, CALIFORNIA LAWYER, April 1989, at 31. In Chicago, advo-
cates estimate that, based on information from the National Crime Survey, approximately 90% of
the wife abuse cases are classified as misdemeanors, despite the gravity of the injuries. Blodgett,
supra note 53, at 68.
Whether the assault is classified as a misdemeanor or a felony, the penalties imposed in battering
cases commonly will be less severe than those in cases involving nonrelated combatants. L.
LERMAN, supra note 48, at 28.
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Battered women drop charges for several reasons. Many women are
coerced by the fear of further violence at the hands of their batterers.78
Often the cumbersome nature of the legal system is overwhelming during
a time of great personal and economic turmoil for the woman.79 Some
battered women, simply not understanding how the judicial system
works,80 have no one to explain the process to them.81 Battered women
frequently love their batterers and do not want to see them jailed.82
Also, the couple may reconcile before the case is brought to trial.83
Other women are unable for economic reasons to take the time necessary
to see the prosecution through to completion.84 In many cases, the wo-
man's decision to drop charges flows from the advice of prosecutors who
may discourage her from pursuing the case.85
III. THE POWER OF THE LAW SUIT
Battered women sue police departments primarily on theories of equal
protection, 6 due process,87 and tort, 8 with varying degrees of success.
While law suits sometimes prove effective in protecting and compensat-
ing individual battered women and punishing their batterers, the suits
78. The batterer may threaten the victim into dropping the charges. An assistant district attor-
ney in Santa Barbara, California, reports that 50% of the women who come to drop charges are
escorted by their batterers. L. LERMAN, supra note 48, at 19. When prosecutors terminate charges
in these circumstances, they perpetuate the man's domination of the woman. Most importantly, the
batterer learns that threats are an acceptable and effective tool. Pastoor, supra note 57, at 566.
79. In hearings conducted by California's Judicial Council's Advisory Committee on Gender
Bias, court administrators, prosecutors, battered women, and their advocates characterized the court
system as "a chamber of horrors for a battered woman, from the moment she calls police until she
confronts her abuser in a custody dispute." Palermo, supra note 77, at 31.
80. L. LERMAN, supra note 48, at 13.
81. Id. at 19.
82. Id. at 13.
83. Id. at 19.
84. Id. at 13. Often women cannot afford to miss work for the period of the trial. Id. Battered
women usually go to the police and the courts appealing for immediate help. The victim may be
dissuaded from using the court system when it can take months for it to process her case. Id. at 19.
85. Anticipating that the woman will eventually drop the charges, prosecutors sometimes ad-
vise her to do so promptly in order to save themselves time. Id. Most prosecutors' offices have
overwhelming caseloads. Staff cannot afford to spend time encouraging reluctant victims to cooper-
ate with the prosecutors. Prosecutors, forced to prioritize, may be concerned with pursuing cases in
which conviction is likely and those that potentially will advance the prosecutor's career. Thus, the
seriousness of the crime and the likelihood that it will be repeated are not necessarily the determin-
ing factors. Id. at 23.
86. See infra notes 90-121 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 122-35 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 136-48 and accompanying text.
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have failed to bring about widespread change in police response to do-
mestic violence calls.89
A. Equal Protection Challenges
Battered women have made equal protection9O challenges to police de-
partment policies most often to demonstrate that police departments
treat domestic assaults differently than violence among unrelated individ-
uals. Since a disproportionate number of domestic abuse victims are wo-
men,9 1 women are thus disparately harmed when police response to these
calls is inadequate.92
In Thurman v. City of Torrington,93 a battered woman brought suit
after being brutally attacked and severely injured by her estranged hus-
band following the willful disregard by the police of eight months of his
threats and attacks.94 She argued that because police policy provided full
protection to victims of nondomestic violence while affording consist-
89. Recent Development, supra note 60, at 219-20.
90. The equal protection clause provides: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
91. See infra note 100.
92. Battered women challenge such policies under § 1983, which provides citizens with a fed-
eral remedy when state officials deprive them of their constitutional rights while acting under color
of state law. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1986). Courts have defined police departments and municipalities as a "person"
under § 1983. See, eg., Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1530 (1). Conn. 1984).
93. 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
94. Id. at 1524-26. During an eight-month period, while the plaintiff lived in the home of
friends, her husband was arrested once, attacked her several times, forcefully took their son from
her, and continuously threatened to kill her. She and her friends made numerous complaints, by
phone and in person, to the Torrington police. Police officers either did not take their complaints or
would not respond. The batterer continued to threaten his wife's life and to violate the terms of the
probation resulting from an earlier arrest. Her complaints were either rebuffed or she was asked to
return at a later date to file a warrant for her husband's arrest. Although the plaintiff's brother-in-
law was advised that her husband would be arrested, no arrest ever occurred. Id. at 1524-25.
Finally, the plaintiff's husband returned to her house and stabbed her repeatedly in the neck,
chest, and throat. Id. at 1525. In the presence of the police, who arrived 25 minutes after she called
for help, her husband, still holding a bloody knife, kicked her twice in the head and yet was allowed
to walk about freely. He was finally arrested and taken into custody when he, for the third time in
the presence of the police, menacingly approached his wife as she lay on a stretcher. Id. at 1526.
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ently less protection to victims of domestic violence it violated equal pro-
tection guarantees.95
The district court held that both acts and omissions by the police are
subject to the equal protection clause.96 The court further noted that
equal protection imposes upon police officers an affirmative duty to take
reasonable steps to protect the safety of community members when on
notice of a danger to an individual, regardless of whether the threat to
safety is from a spouse or a stranger.
97
The court found that the plaintiff had established a pattern of police
inaction in response to victims of domestic violence sufficient to show
discriminatory implementation of the law.98 Furthermore, the court
concluded that she successfully demonstrated a pattern of complete po-
lice disregard of her complaints over a period of months, thus creating an
inference that a discriminatory "custom" existed.99 The court required
the city to justify the disparate treatment of women,"oo a burden the city
95. Id. at 1526-27. The court noted that the applicability of equal protection to discriminatory
government administration is well settled. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (facially-
neutral permit process violated equal protection because of discriminatory application); Britton v.
Rogers, 631 F.2d 572, 577 (8th Cir. 1980) (equal protection applies to discriminatory government
administration and enforcement of laws), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939 (1981).
96. 595 F. Supp. at 1527. The court relied on precedent holding police officers liable for failing
to perform statutorily required duties. See Smith v. Ross, 482 F.2d 33, 36-37 (6th Cir. 1973)
(although not liable under facts of case, an officer violates equal protection when he discharges duties
unequally through inaction); Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1972) (police officer who
stood by while other officers beat plaintiff held liable under § 1983); Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382,
1387 (6th Cir. 1972) (equal protection applies when there is failure to act). See also Johnson v.
Duffy, 588 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1978) (in certain situations, statute or regulation may impose affirma-
tive duties on police officers).
97. 595 F. Supp. at 1527.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1530. Under § 1983, a municipality is liable for violating the equal protection clause
when a custom of discriminatory response is established, even absent formal approval. Plaintiffs
must normally point to facts outside their own cases to support an allegation of discriminatory
custom. Here, however, the court found the plaintiff's own interactions with the police sufficient to
establish the requisite custom. Id.
The plaintiff's son, who also fied a claim, made allegations similar to his mother's, but the court
held that he was unable to show a pattern of police failure to protect him. Id. at 1529.
100. Id. at 1527. The court accepted the plaintiff's allegations of gender-based discrimination,
noting a study of family abuse that showed that in 29 of 30 cases, the male was the batterer. Id. at
1528 n.1 (citing Leeds, Family Offense Cases in the Family Court System: A Statistical Description,
Henry Street Settlement Urban Life Center, Nov. 1978, at ii). Since the city administered a policy
discriminating against women, the court required the city to show an important government interest
to support the discrimination. Id. at 1527. This standard, commonly known as intermediate scru-
tiny, is employed in statutes involving gender-based classifications and classifications based on illegit-
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did not meet.' A jury awarded the plaintiff 2.3 million dollars in com-
pensatory damages against 24 policemen.1
0 2
Following Thurman, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit faced
a similar equal protection challenge in Watson v. City of Kansas City.10 3
The plaintiff in Watson was physically abused and repeatedly threatened
by her husband, a police officer. 04 She also had numerous contacts with
the police.'0 5 After the couple divorced and the plaintiff requested police
protection, her ex-husband locked her in her home, and raped, beat and
stabbed her.'16
The Tenth Circuit reversed a district court order granting the defend-
ant city summary judgment. 1 7 In reviewing the equal protection chal-
lenge, the court noted that while the Constitution does not grant a right
to police protection, when a state does provide protection it may not do
so in a discriminatory fashion.' 08 The court found that evidence" 9 that
officers were trained to use arrest only as a last resort in domestic dis-
putes, in conjunction with the alleged pattern of deliberate police indiffer-
ence in response to the plaintiff's complaints was sufficient to allow a
jury to infer that a custom of discrimination existed towards victims of
domestic abuse as a class." 10 However, the court held that the allegations
could not support a claim of gender-based discrimination because the
policy was facially neutral, providing the same level of inadequate pro-
unacy or alienage. See, eg., Lalli v. Lali, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
101. 595 F. Supp. at 1528-29. The court rejected the city's argument that police nonintervention
in domestic violence protected the family's privacy. The plaintiff's repeated requests for outside help
overcame any privacy interest. Id. at 159.
102. Thurman v. City of Torrington, No. H-84-120 (D. Conn. June 25, 1985) (settlement).
103. 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988).
104. Id. at 692.
105. Id. After her first complaint, a police captain threatened that, should she ever call again,
her children would be taken away from her. Id.
106. Id. at 693.
107. Id. at 698.
108. Id. at 694.
109. While the court found statistics showing a disparity in arrest rates between domestic abuse
and nondomestic abuse cases persuasive, it concluded that statistics alone may not be enough to
establish a discriminatory custom. Id. at 696.
110. Id. Citing Thurman, the court held that it need not decide whether the establishment of a
pattern of police indifference to one individual's complaints would, by itself, suffice to create an
inference of a discriminatory custom. The court did, however, explain in dicta that since equal
protection challenges require the plaintiff to show that the discrimination was based on membership
in a particular class, evidence concerning a single individual probably would not suffice. Id.
1991]
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tection to both male and female victims of domestic abuse."'
Two months after the Watson decision, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit further narrowed the possible equal protection challenges
to police nonresponse in Hynson v. City of Chester Legal Department.112
Hynson was a suit brought by the mother and children of a woman killed
by her boyfriend.113 The Third Circuit, adopting the reasoning of the
Watson court, held that police differentiation between victims of domes-
tic violence and those of nondomestic violence, alone, was insufficient to
establish a claim of sex-based discrimination. 114 The court noted that the
plaintiffs also bear the burden of showing that the police instituted the
policy intending to discriminate against women. 115
The police officers in Hynson raised a qualified immunity defense,
which protects officers performing discretionary functions if it can rea-
sonably be believed that their actions did not invade the right allegedly
violated.116 In the case of a facially-neutral policy, the court held that
the officers would lose their qualified immunity only if a reasonable po-
lice officer would know: 1) that such a policy had a discriminatory im-
pact on women; 2) that the policy was motivated by bias against women;
and 3) that the adoption of the policy serves no important public
interest. 117
Following Hynson and Watson, demonstrating that a facially-neutral
policy discriminates against women will prove at least burdensome and
I 11. Id. at 696-97. Because of this facial neutrality, a challenger would have to show two things:
1) that the policy adversely affected women; and 2) that the policy was adopted for the purpose, at
least in part, of discriminating against women. See Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 281 (1979) (facially-neutral classification does not violate equal protection as long as law was
enacted "in spite of" not "because of" its adverse effects on women). Since neither of these prelimi-
nary evidentiary requirements was fulfilled, the court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a
prima facie case of gender-based discrimination. 857 F.2d at 697.
112. 864 F.2d 1026 (3rd Cir. 1988).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1031. But see Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 701-02 (9th Cir. 1990)
(reversing district court's dismissal of plaintiff's equal protection claim, court held that abusive re-
marks by police officer to victim suggesting she deserved to be hit indicated that domestic assault
cases were treated less seriously than other assaults and animosity existed towards battered women).
115. 864 F.2d at 1031.
116. Id. at 1027. The qualified immunity defense does not apply to municipalities. See Owen v.
City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638, reh'g denied, 446 U.S. 993 (1980); Watson v. City of
Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 697 (10th Cir. 1988).
117. Id. at 1032. The court explained that this standard balanced the individual's equal protec-
tion interest in challenging a discriminatorily applied policy against the right of police officers to
perform their duties without being exposed to the perpetual fear of bothersome litigation. Id.
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sometimes insurmountable for battered women."1 ' These courts held
that proof of police discrimination simply against victims of domestic
violence is insufficient to invalidate a facially neutral policy. Battered
women must further show that the policy was, at least in part, intended
to discriminate against women. 1 9 The existence of a disparate impact
usually falls short of demonstrating subjective intent, 2 ° although Thur-
man, which predated Watson and Hynson, held that a severe disparity
may create an inference of intentional discrimination.121
B. Due Process Litigation
In Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department,22 a battered woman ar-
gued that police disregard for her complaints of verbal and physical har-
assment by her estranged husband 23 constituted a violation of due
process. 124 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit began its analysis
of her claim by recognizing that, in general, the police have no constitu-
tional duty to protect individual members of the public at large.25 The
court, however, stated that such a duty may arise from a "special rela-
tionship" between the police and a specific individual.126 The court fur-
ther noted that "special relationships" could exist in several
118. The Supreme Court however, occasionally has been willing to find discriminatory intent
based on the severity of the disparate impact. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the
Court held that a law prohibiting the use of wooden buildings for laundries amounted to a racial
classification since, as administered, it affected only Chinese-owned laundries. Non-Chinese laundry
owners were administratively exempted from meeting the law's requirements. See also Avery v.
Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303 (1879).
119. See supra note 109.
120. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (employment eligibility exam with disproportionate im-
pact on blacks did not violate equal protection since no proof of discriminatory intent existed).
121. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
122. 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990).
123. 901 F.2d at 698. In February 1982, the plaintiff's husband brutally assaulted her. The
police escorted her husband away from the home but did not arrest him. Despite her numerous
injuries requiring medical treatment, the police did not offer the plaintiff, Jena Balistreri, medical
assistance. Throughout 1982, Balistreri repeatedly complained to the police regarding harassing
phone calls and vandalism by her husband. In November of that year, and even after she obtained a
restraining order, the police refused to arrest her husband who had crashed through her garage in his
car. The police consistently failed to respond adequately to further harassment by her husband,
despite Balistreri's requests for help. Id.
124. The due process clause provides: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend.
XIV, § 1.
125. 901 F.2d at 699-700.
126. Id. at 700.
Washington University Open Scholarship
862 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 69:843
circumstances: 1) when the state created or assumed a custodial relation-
ship toward the plaintiff; 2) when the state affirmatively places the plain-
tiff in a dangerous position; 3) when the state was aware that the plaintiff
faced a specific risk of injury; or 4) when the state affirmatively assumed
responsibility for the protection of the plaintiff.127
The plaintiff, Jena Balistreri, alleged that the fourth category applied
to her situation. She claimed that the issuance of a restraining order
committed the state to protecting her.128  The court, previously per-
suaded by this argument,129 rejected it citing the recent Supreme Court
case of DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services. t3
In DeShaney, a case involving child abuse, the Court limited "special
relationships" only to those situations in which the state takes a citizen
into custody against his will, thereby limiting the ability of an individual
to protect himself.131 Therefore, the Balistreri court held that no "spe-
127. Id. See also Ketchum v. Alameda County, 811 F.2d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1987) (factors for
determining existence of special relationship are: 1) Custodial relationship created by state; 2) state's
awareness of specific risk to plaintiff, and 3) whether state put plaintiff in dangerous position); Es-
camilla v. Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1986) (state obligation to protect may arise if state
put plaintiff in dangerous position).
128. 901 F.2d at 700.
129. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 855 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1988). In its first decision, the
court held that unintentional conduct was open to challenge under § 1983. Id. at 1424. The court
held sufficient Balistreri's allegations of intentional harassment by the police, or alternatively, their
deliberate or reckless disregard for her well-being. Id. at 1424-25. The court concluded that, if
Balistreri's allegations were true, the failure of police to respond to the continued harassment and
violence towards her implicated her right to liberty under the due process clause. Id. at 1425. The
court held that both the restraining order issued to Balistreri and her repeated complaints to the
police created a "special relationship" between her and the police. The police thus owed Balistreri a
duty to take reasonable steps to protect her from her estranged husband. Id. at 1426.
130. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). DeShaney was a suit by a child (acting through his mother) who had
been severely beaten by his father, against local officials and social workers who failed to remove the
child from his father's custody despite receiving numerous complaints of abuse. Id. at 189. The
Court held that the due process clause functions not as an affirmative guarantee of safety, but rather
as a limit on the state's power to act. Id. at 195. "Its purpose was to protect the people from the
State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each other." Id. at 196. Thus, in general, the
Court held that the state's failure to protect one citizen from assault by another was not violative of
due process. Id. at 197.
131. Id. at 200. The Supreme Court held that the affirmative duty to protect did not come from
the knowledge that a citizen faced the threat of injury, but arose in a situation in which the state
affirmatively limits a citizen's capacity to defend himself. Thus, incarceration by the state, which
puts the state in the role of custodian, triggers due process protection. Id. The Court concluded
that only through the state's own tort system could police be held liable for failure to respond
outside of custodial conditions. Id. at 203.
Dissenting in DeShaney, Justice Brennan argued that the Constitution mandated a more active
role for the police, considering the circumstances of the case. Id. at 203 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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cial relationship" existed between Balistreri and the police. 132
Because DeShaney considerably narrowed the "special relationship"
doctrine, it has effectively foreclosed substantive due process challenges
by battered women because of the close analogy to child abuse.1 33 Only
if the abuse occurs while in police custody will a battered woman have a
strong case with which to challenge police inaction.1 34  Plaintiffs have a
chance of success challenging a police failure to act under due process
only if lower courts interpret DeShaney narrowly, holding it to its
facts.'
35
C. Tort Claims: Police Breach of Duty to Act
In Nearing v. Weaver, t36 a woman and her children sued the police for
their failure to enforce a restraining order against the children's father.'37
Oregon's Abuse Prevention Act'38 calls for the issuance of temporary
restraining orders to protect individuals threatened by present or former
spouses.139 Additionally, it mandates warrantless arrest when a police
Justice Brennan began his analysis by examining the action taken by the state. Id. at 205. Justice
Brennan then concluded that earlier state action may be conclusive in determining the constitution-
ality of subsequent state inaction. Id. at 208.
In this case, Justice Brennan reasoned, Wisconsin created a child-welfare system to protect and
care for abused children. State law placed a duty on the local social services offices to investigate
complaints of child abuse. Id. at 208. This system invited citizens and other interested agencies to
rely on the social services department to protect abused children from further harm. Furthermore,
the social services department was the sole body in control of the decision of whether to intervene in
a particular case. Id. at 209. Justice Brennan argued that, "[u]nfortunately for Joshua DeShaney,
the buck effectively stopped with the Department." 1d. at 209. Through their inaction, Justice
Brennan argued, the state effectively "confined Joshua DeShaney within the walls of Randy
DeShaney's violent home until such time as [the department] took action to remove him." Justice
Brennan concluded "that inaction can be every bit as abusive of power as action, that oppression can
result when a state undertakes a vital duty and then ignores it." Id. at 212.
132. 901 F.2d at 700.
133. Note, Battered Women Suing Police for Failure to Intervene: Viable Legal Avenues After
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1393, 1411
(1990).
134. Note, supra note 56, at 1383.
135. Id. at 1389.
136. 295 Or. 702, 670 P.2d 137 (1983).
137. Id. at 705-06, 670 P.2d at 139-40. Police failed to enforce a restraining order against the
plaintiff's husband, from whom she was separated. This inaction continued even after the husband's
repeated harassment, threats, and child abduction attempts, including an assault upon a friend of the
plaintiff. Id.
138. 1977 Or. Laws ch. 845.
139. OR. REv. STAT. § 107.716 (1990). Six years before the Oregon Supreme Court decided
Nearing, a court in New York faced a similar suit based on common law negligence. In Bruno v.
Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1977), a group of battered women challenged police
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officer has probable cause to believe that a restraining order has been
violated. 14
The plaintiff, Henrietta Nearing, sued for damages, claiming that the
police inaction amounted to the negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress.14 1 The Supreme Court of Oregon held that state law allows recov-
ery for the emotional harm inflicted when the defendant's behavior
violates a plaintiff's legal rights. 42 The court found that the statutory
mandate and the issuance of a restraining order gave rise to a special
duty owed by the police to this plaintiff. 
143
The police officers defended their inaction as a "discretionary function
or duty," which, as such, should be immune from liability. 144 The court
held that discretion exists solely when the law requires officers to make
value judgments or policy choices among competing priorities.145 The
court concluded that the legislature intended to limit police discretion in
inaction and sought declaratory and injunctive relief claiming that the police automatically refused
to intervene in domestic abuse situations unless there was a valid order of protection. Id. at 1048,
396 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
The court, concluding that it had the power to require the police to exercise discretion in a nonar-
bitrary fashion, refused the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. Id. at 1050, 396 N.Y.S.2d
at 977. The court reasoned that women battered by their husbands are just as deserving of police
protection as other victims of assault, despite the fact that primary jurisdiction for adjudicating
domestic violence cases lay with the family courts and not the criminal courts. Id.
One commentator reports that repercussions from Bruno v. Codd were strongly felt throughout
New York's police departments, as they were forced to implement changes in policy. Gundle, Civil
Liabilityfor Police Failure to Arrest: Nearing v. Weaver, 9 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 259, 261 (1986).
140. A peace officer shall arrest and take into custody a person without a warrant when the
peace officer has probable cause to believe that:
(a) There exists an order issued pursuant to ORS 107.095(l)(c) or (d), 107.716 or
107.718 restraining the person; and
(b) A true copy of the order and proof of service on the person has been filed as re-
quired in ORS 107.720; and
(c) The peace officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has
violated the terms of that order.
OR. REV. STAT. § 133.310(3) (1990) (emphasis added).
141. 295 Or. at 706, 670 P.2d at 140.
142. Id. The court distinguished this from a conventional tort claim brought in negligence. Id.
143. Id. at 708, 670 P.2d at 141.
144. Id. at 710, 670 P.2d at 142. See also Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690 (10th
Cir. 1988). Nancy Watson, a battered woman, alleged that police failed to arrest her estranged
husband despite assurances to the contrary. Id. at 697. The court found that these facts indicated
negligence on the part of the individual officers in performing their duty to protect specific citizens
and, therefore, that the police were not immune from suit. Id. at 698. See supra notes 103-11 and
accompanying text.
145. 295 Or. at 710, 670 P.2d at 142 (citing McBride v. Magnuson, 282 Or. 433, 578 P.2d 1259
(1978)).
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the enforcement of restraining orders. 1" As a result, police officers who
knowingly fail to enforce a restraining order under the statute face poten-
tial liability. 147 The Nearing decision strongly favors battered women
plaintiffs, under one of the more forceful mandatory arrest statutes in the
United States. 148
IV. LEGISLATIVE MANDATES
Modem domestic abuse legislation was introduced in the early
146. Id.
147. Id. at 714, 670 P.2d at 145. Since Nearing was decided, most Oregon police officers auto-
matically arrest batterers suspected of breaching restraining orders. Gundle, supra note 139, at 265.
148. Many suits against police departments never make it to trial. In Scott v. Hart, No. C76-
2395 WWS (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 1979), battered women challenged the Oakland, California Police
Department's practice of failing to provide assistance to domestic abuse victims. In a settlement
decree, the police agreed to treat battering as they would any other crime and to abandon an arrest-
avoidance policy. Gundle, supra note 139, at 261. See also Bruno v. Codd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 590, 393
N.E.2d 976, 980, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901, 905 (1979). In Bruno, the parties agreed to settle before trial
and entered a consent judgment. The consent decree provides:
2) The Police Department and its employees have a duty to and shall respond [in per-
son] to every request for assistance or protection from or on behalf of a woman based on an
allegation that a violation or crime, or a violation of an Order of Protection or Temporary
Order of Protection, has been committed against her by a person alleged to be her
husband[.]
4) Where there is reasonable cause to believe that a husband has committed a felony
against his wife and/or has violated an Order of Protection or Temporary Order of Protec-
tion, the officer shall not attempt to reconcile the parties or mediate and the officer shall
arrest the husband.
6) In any instance where a wife or someone on her behalf charges... that a husband
has violated an Order of Protection or Temporary Order of Protection, it is the responsibil-
ity of a police officer to, and the officer shall, arrest the husband provided that the officer
finds that reasonable cause exists for the officer to believe that the conduct charged is
within the scope of such Order, and that the husband has committed the alleged act.
Sorichetti v. City of New York, 95 Misc. 2d 451, 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 219, 229 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
A similar settlement in Thomas v. City of Los Angeles, Case # CA 000572, cited in Legal Victory
for Los Angeles Battered Women, REsPONSE, Fall 1985, at 8, resulted in a multi-faceted decree. The
decree provisions required the police to assign domestic violence calls the same priority as other
violent crimes. The decree required the police department to train its officers to apply the new
standards and to make a one-time grant of $50,000 to local battered women's shelters. The court
maintained jurisdiction to monitor implementation of the new standards.
Consent decrees have begun to change police practice towards domestic violence victims in several
jurisdictions. However, decrees do not always guarantee that battered women will be treated the
same as other victims of assault. Note, Sorichetti v. City of New York Tells the Police that Liability
Looms for Failure to Respond to Domestic Violence Situations, 40 U. MIMI L. REv. 333, 345 (1985)
(authored by Greg Anderson). Consent decrees are most effective when they delineate the conse-
quences to the police department for failure to abide by the agreement. Id. at n.72.
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1970s. 14 9 At that time, every state authorized police officers to make
felony arrests on probable cause without a warrant, while only fourteen
states called for such arrests when probable cause indicated the commis-
sion of a misdemeanor. 50 State laws authorized officers to make war-
rantless misdemeanor arrests only when they actually witnessed the
commission of the crime,151 a rarity in domestic violence. Simple assault
and battery, the crimes most commonly committed in domestic violence
cases, are classified as misdemeanors in most states. 15 2 Thus the arrest
laws in the vast majority of states offered little protection to women, un-
less they took the time to file for an arrest warrant.15 3
In the last decade, the requirement that the police officer witness the
misdemeanor in order to make an arrest has become less universal.15 4
Nonetheless, most police departments today continue to discourage
arrest as the preferred action in domestic violence cases. A survey of
large city police departments in 1984 found that fifty percent had no pol-
icy concerning domestic violence, forty percent encouraged mediation,
while only ten percent encouraged arrest.' 55
Today, most jurisdictions fall under one of three statutory classifica-
tions: 1) those authorizing arrest only when probable cause of a felony
exists;156 2) those permitting arrest when the officer has probable cause to
149. Law Enforcement Training Project, supra note 62, at 6.
150. Id.
151. L. LERMAN, supra note 48, at 124.
152. Law Enforcement Training Project, supra note 62, at 6.
153. Id. Police officers responding to domestic violence calls rarely seek misdemeanor arrest
warrants; they are usually issued only when the victims file private criminal charges. L. LERMAN,
supra note 48, at 125.
154. The American Law Institute recommends the following standards in statutes authorizing
warrantless arrests:
§ 120.1 Authority to Arrest Without a Warrant - A Law enforcement officer may arrest a
person without a warrant if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that such a person
has committed:
a. a felony,
b. a misdemeanor, and the officer has reasonable cause to believe that such person
(i) will not be apprehended unless immediately arrested, or
(ii) may cause injury to himself or others or damage to property unless immedi-
ately arrested, or
c. a misdemeanor or petty misdemeanor in the officer's presence.
ALI, A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 13 (1975) (emphasis added).
155. L. SHERMAN, supra note 58, at 1-2.
156. For example, the arrest law in Washington, D.C. provides:
[Vol. 69:843
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believe a misdemeanor was committed or a restraining order violated;15 7
and 3) those mandating arrest.15
§ 23-581. Arrests without warrant by law enforcement officers.
(aX1) A law enforcement officer may arrest, without a warrant having previously been
issued therefor -
(A) a person who he has probable cause to believe has committed or is committing a
felony;
(B) a person who he has probable cause to believe has committed or is committing an
offense in his presence;
(C) a person who he has probable cause to believe has committed or is about to commit
any offense listed in paragraph (2) and, unless immediately arrested, may not be appre-
hended, may cause injury to others, or may tamper with, dispose of, or destroy evidence.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-581 (1981).
157. Today, 48 states authorize police officers to arrest without a warrant in cases of domestic
violence with West Virginia and Alabama being the exceptions. Law Enforcement Training Project,
supra note 62, at 6. For example, Arizona's arrest law provides:
A peace officer may, with or without a warrant, arrest a person if the peace officer has
probable cause to believe that the person has violated § 13-2810 by disobeying or resisting
an order issued pursuant to this section, whether or not such violation occurred in the
presence of the officer.
ARiz. REv. STAT. § 13-3602(K) (1989) (emphasis added).
New Hampshire's arrest law provides:
594:10 Arrest without a warrant.
I. An arrest by a peace officer without a warrant on a charge of a misdemeanor or a
violation is lawful whenever:
(b) He has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has assaulted a family
or household member... within the past 6 hours[.]
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 594:10 (1986) (emphasis added).
Half of the states providing for warrantless misdemeanor arrest require further evidence, such as a
visible injury, or a limited period of time directly following the crime during which the police may
arrest. Law Enforcement Training Project, supra note 62, at 6.
158. By 1988, 10 states (Connecticut, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Nevada, New Jersey, North Car-
olina, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin) had passed some form of mandatory arrest law. Law
Enforcement Training Project, supra note 62, at 7-8. For example, Maine's arrest law provides:
5. Arrest in certain situations. When a law enforcement officer has probable cause to
believe that there has been a criminal violation of a court approved consent agreement or a
protective order ... or that a violation of [aggravated assault] has occurred between mem-
bers of the same family or household he shall arrest and take into custody the alleged
offender.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 770(5) (Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
Similarly, North Carolina's mandatory arrest law provides:
(b) A law-enforcement officer shall arrest and take a person into custody without a
warrant or other process if the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has
violated a court order excluding the person from the residence or household occupied by a
victim of domestic violence or directing the person to refrain from harassing or interfering
with the victim[.]
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-4(b) (1989) (emphasis added).
Outside the realm of domestic violence, few states have instituted mandatory arrest policies. Law
Enforcement Training Project, supra note 62, at 8.
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V. MANDATORY ARREST POLICIES ARE THE PROPER RESPONSE
Both permissive and mandatory arrest policies make arrest in domestic
violence more likely than is the case under traditional law, which re-
quires police to witness the commission of a misdemeanor to arrest.
However, permissive arrest laws, which provide that police "may" arrest
when probable cause exists that a domestic assault has been committed,
still leave officers with potent discretion to forgo arrest.1 59 Mandatory
arrest policies, on the other hand, require that police officers "shall"
arrest if such probable cause exists.1" Therefore, the policy decision,
removed from the hands of individual police officers, properly rests with
legislators or police chiefs.
A. Statistical Support
Recently, there has been a growing consensus that mandatory misde-
meanor arrest laws deter domestic abuse more effectively than either per-
missive misdemeanor arrest laws or probable cause felony arrest laws.1 61
The most prominent survey of the effects of various approaches was the
Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment. 62 The Minneapolis Exper-
iment studied the effect of different modes of police intervention in do-
mestic abuse calls over a six-month period.163
Thirty-five police officers took part in the experiment. The police de-
partment randomly assigned one of three approaches with which to han-
dle domestic violence calls: 1) arrest; 2) mediation; or 3) requesting that
the batterer leave the home for eight hours. 64 The study showed that
when officers attempted to mediate there was a thirty-seven percent
chance of further violence within the following six months; a thirty-three
percent chance of subsequent violence existed among those temporarily
159. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
161. See COMMUNITY COUNCIL OF GREATER NEW YORK, ARREST AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
TRENDS IN STATE LAWS AND FINDIGs FROM RESEARCH, RESEARCH UTILIZATION UPDATE No.
23, at 3 (Aug. 1988).
162. Id. at 3. The council conducted the study between 1981 and 1982.
163. Cohn, supra note 64, at 23.
164. Gundle, supra note 139, at 260. For an incident of abuse to be included in the study, the
disturbance had to be a misdemeanor and both parties had to be in the home when the police inter-
vened. Furthermore, it was required that the officer determine that probable cause existed that
battering had occurred in the previous four hours. COMMUNITY COUNCIL OF GREATER NEW
YORK, supra note 161, at 4.
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sent away from the home.165 By contrast, there was only a nineteen per-
cent chance of recurring violence when an arrest was made.1
66
Other studies support the conclusions of the Minneapolis Domestic
Violence Experiment. 67 In 1984, the Attorney General's Task Force on
Family Violence issued a report on police arrest policies; it recommended
arrest as the preferred police policy. 68 An experiment in California,
modeled after the Minneapolis study, also showed that arrest deters
spouse abuse more effectively than do other police responses. 169 Studies
in Canada and New Zealand demonstrate similar results. 170  Thus, the
165. COMMUNITY COUNCIL OF GREATER NEW YORK, supra note 161, at 4. The statistics for
violence in the six months following the initial police intervention came from biweekly interviews
with the victims and police records. Follow-ups also were conducted using police records that
showed that there was repeat violence within six months in 24% of the "sent away" batterers, 19%
in those cases that were mediated, and 10% when arrests were made. Id.
166. Follow-up interviews indicated that when the police officer took the time to listen to the
victim's complaints before arresting the batterer, there was only a nine percent chance of repeat
violence. When the officer arrested the batterer without listening to the victim, however, a 26%
chance of further violence existed. Id. at 5. Sherman and Berk, who conducted the Minneapolis
Experiment, concluded that arrest limited the subsequent violence of habitual abusers, since most of
the men in the study had victimized their wives repeatedly in the past. Thus, they found that arrest
was an effective deterrent with more than just occasional or one-time offenders. Williams and Haw-
kins, The Meaning of Arrest for Wife Assault, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 163, 164 (1989).
167. See COMMUNITY COUNCIL OF GREATER NEW YORK, supra note 161, at 5. The National
Crime Survey, a study measuring the criminal victimization of Americans for the years 1978
through 1982, showed that women who called the police were less likely to face repeat violence than
women who did not call. Id. at 5-6. Of the women who called the police to complain of battering,
16% reported subsequent violence within six months of the initial incident, while 23% of the women
who did not call were victims of further battering within that time. Id. at 6. Likewise, the results of
a Duluth, Minnesota project demonstrate a measured decline in repetitious calls from victims whose
mates were arrested. Pence, supra note 72, at 258.
Some commentators, however, raise several questions concerning the veracity of the Minneapolis
findings. Of paramount concern is whether batterers who police arrested discouraged their wives
from reporting any further violence through threats. This concern also applies to the truthfulness of
answers made to the interviewers throughout the six-month follow-up period. Commentators also
raise concerns that some women may have called the police only to protect themselves during the
immediate battering, and did not want to have their husbands arrested; thus, arrest might actually
deter some battered women from calling the police in the first place. L. SHERMAN, supra note 58, at
3.
168. Cohn, supra note 64, at 23.
169. See COMMUNITY COUNCIL OF GREATER NEW YORK, supra note 161, at 7.
170. Torgbor, Police Intervention in Domestic Violence - A Comparative View, 1989 FAM. L.
195, 195-96. A study in London, Ontario found a significant decrease in battering incidents follow-
ing the Solicitor General's ruling requiring arrest when the "facts and circumstances warrant this
action." Id. During a 12-month follow-up period, cases in which the victim was bitten, hit, or
kicked declined from 56.2% to 22.9% following police intercession. Research results suggest that
the arrest policy increased victims' confidence in police intervention. Id.
In 1986, the city of Hamilton, New Zealand conducted a six-month study during which the police
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implementation of mandatory arrest policies seems to decrease spousal
abuse in the jurisdiction.
B. Treating a Violent Crime for What It Is
Wife abuse is a violent crime. American law has evolved from a sys-
tem in which wife battering was not only acceptable, but legal. 17 1 Deeply
rooted historical prejudices made a criminal justice system that does not
adequately serve the needs of victims of domestic violence.172 Police of-
ficers, prosecutors and judges must become more informed about the na-
ture of the battering relationship and the needs of its victims in order to
avoid using their discretion in ways that continue to reinforce outdated
notions about the roles of men and women.
Police officers, prosecutors and judges influence each other's reactions
and policies toward domestic violence. 173 Because the police tradition-
department directed officers to arrest the batterer unless there was good cause for not doing so. This
constituted a considerable change from the previous police practice of requiring good cause in order
to make an arrest. Both police officers and victims reported favorable reactions to the arrest policy.
During the study, the number of batterers arrested increased vastly, with 80% of those arrested
charged and found guilty. As a result of the study, New Zealand implemented a mandatory arrest
policy throughout the country. Id. at 196.
New South Wales, Australia also has instituted a mandatory arrest law, requiring that police not
leave the batterer in the home if he committed an offense. In 1983, a multidisciplinary committee
was created to monitor the results of the implemented policy. Id. at 106.
The city of Duluth, Minnesota created a plan that coordinates the response of the police, the
criminal justice system, and human service agencies in dealing with domestic abuse. Pence, supra
note 72, at 255. Nine agencies take part in the program, including the police, the county jail, the city
attorney's office, the probation department, a battered women's shelter, and four counseling agen-
cies. The purpose of the scheme, known as the Domestic Abuse Intervention Project (DAIP), is to
provide a uniform response to batterers. Id. at 255.
DAIP staff concluded that batterers generally do not take charges instituted by their victims as
seriously as those instituted by the police. Even though batterers believe they can coerce their vic-
tims into dropping charges, id. at 258, the DAIP staff did not adopt a stringent "no drop" policy
once the police had initiated charges. Other programs' accounts of victims subpoenaed and arrested
for not testifying against their husbands persuaded the DAIP to institute a more flexible policy.
Instead of placing the onus to testify on the victim, the DAIP required that the arresting officer be
the complaining witness, a step that led many batterers to plead guilty. Id. at 260.
Commentators believe that the most significant modification instituted by the DAIP was a change
in focus. Before the project, the criminal justice system viewed battering as the result of dysfunc-
tional relationships, leading intervenors to mediate and work to improve the relationship. The
DAIP changed this view, emphasizing that battering is criminal conduct and deserves to be treated
as such. Id. at 269.
171. See supra note 56.
172. See infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
173. As with most others throughout the criminal justice system, judges often do not view do-
mestic violence cases as being of great significance. Judges rarely sentence batterers to jail, and the
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ally do not arrest, prosecutors do not take abuse cases to trial. As a
result of hearing few domestic violence cases in their courtrooms, judges
often underestimate the severity of the problem. When judges do hear
cases, some fall into the old trap of blaming the victim and impose leni-
ent sentences.1 74 Prosecutors then get the message that domestic vio-
lence is not a high judicial priority, and hence avoid prosecuting cases.
Police officers, in turn, see it as a waste of time to take the domestic
violence call seriously since nothing will come of it.
Educating judicial officers about the criminality and prevalence of bat-
tering can only occur if batterers are arrested. Studies indicate that, left
to their own discretion, many police officers choose not to arrest.
175
Mandatory arrest laws and policies must be implemented in order to in-
stitute a systemic change from the bottom, up.1 76
Many batterers and their victims continue to adhere to notions that
men have the right to beat their wives. 177 Arrest and punishment send a
valuable message: battering is against the law and perpetrators will be
punished. 171 This knowledge may strengthen the resolve of battered wo-
men to stand up to their batterers and impress upon police the criminal
nature of these assaults.
Mandatory arrest laws clarify the police officers' role in domestic
fines imposed are mostly ineffective as a deterrent. This may account, in part, for many prosecutors'
treatment of battering without the seriousness it deserves. Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 13, at 865.
Some prosecutors, however, also perpetuate a continued disregard for domestic violence victims.
The practice of consistently failing to initiate prosecutions against batterers can send a clear message
to the police that domestic violence is not to be viewed as a serious crime. Thus a vicious circle is
created: when prosecutors do not bring their cases to court, judges are deprived of knowing the
frequency and severity of the problem. Ellis, supra note 74, at 58.
The expectations that no charge will ensue, that the courts will not convict, and that victims will
not cooperate with the prosecution, have a tendency to become self-fulfilling prophecies. Endicott,
supra note 23, at 368. However, when prosecutors actively prosecute wife battering cases and disal-
low the dismissal of charges, the police make more arrests, thus leading to more prosecutions.
Lerman, Expansion of Arrest Power: A Key to Effective Intervention, 7 VT. L. REv. 59 (1982) [here-
mafter Expansion of Arrest Power].
174. Ignorant about battering relationships and their prevalence, some judges inquire into what
battered women did to precipitate the violence and accept excuses proffered by batterers. Hence the
woman's "provocative" behavior and the man's excuses may be considered mitigating factors.
Waits, supra note 13, at 327.
175. See supra notes 4849, 161-70 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text. Larger numbers of arrests will focus atten-
tion on the severity of the problem. Prosecutors will handle more arrests and judges will face more
batterers in their courtrooms.
177. See supra notes 16, 33 and accompanying text.
178. Gundle, supra note 139, at 260.
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abuse cases.17 9 Wife battering incidents present the police with compli-
cated situations, the dynamics of which they often may not fully compre-
hend. I8 This has led, in the past, to a police preference for mediation or
inaction, both of which are inappropriate in cases of violent crime.18 '
When all parties are aware that domestic abuse will result in arrest, any
confusion surrounding the role of police is eliminated. 182
Mandatory arrest laws also enhance a battered woman's chance of suc-
cess in suits against the police for inaction. The future of due process
challenges was severely limited by the recent Supreme Court holding in
DeShaney.183 Furthermore, equal protection actions commonly require
a showing of discriminatory intent, difficult to establish in most cases.I84
With mandatory arrest policies, women will no longer face the difficulty
of establishing a causal link between police inaction and wife abuse in
tort claims, since such statutes will establish that link for them." 5
Mandatory arrest laws preserve the integrity of the criminal justice
system and publicly reject illegal behavior. Justice requires the similar
treatment of like cases. 186  Assaults upon spouses are as illegal and
179. Recent Development, supra note 60, at 220.
180. Mandatory arrest laws can simplify an officer's job by providing guidelines for what the
officer must do when he or she encounters a battering incident, thus removing an officer's discretion
not to arrest. Note, supra note 56, at 1387.
A study of police response to domestic violence in Canada found that unambiguous rules most
needed are to determine when arrest is proper. Absent such rules, it was clear the police were not
arresting batterers on the same terms as in nondomestic assault cases. Endicott, supra note 23, at
366. Police officers throughout Canada now operate under the assumption that the penalty for
batterers will be arrest. Id. at 368.
181. Cohn, supra note 64, at 22. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text. Many police
resist mandatory arrest policies because they fear the loss of discretion. Police argue that they must
retain control over the decision on a case-by-case basis. Recent Development, supra note 60, at 220.
However, contrary to the understanding of many officers, mandatory arrest laws do not take away
the need for them to make discretionary decisions as to the propriety of arrest. Id. Rather,
mandatory arrest laws serve to level the playing field, requiring officers to apply their discretion in
the same manner in all assaults. Eppler, supra note 53, at 806. Advocating more frequent arrests
does not necessarily mean that arrest is the appropriate alternative in every situation. L. LERMAN,
supra note 48, at 121. To the contrary, mandatory arrest laws merely serve to tell police officers that
arrest, and not mediation, is the appropriate response in domestic violence cases. Id.
182. Furthermore, arrest is more consistent with the role of police. Police are not to act as
counselors; when called to the scene of a crime, their role is to enforce the law. Recent Develop-
ment, supra note 60, at 221.
183. See supra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
185. Note, supra note 56, at 1388.
186. Equal enforcement of the law also will help avoid the discrimination against minorities and
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deplorable as those against strangers.1 87 Laws mandating arrest send a
message to society that battering is considered unacceptable. A change
in society's general acquiescence toward battering may well positively af-
fect the behavior of men who batter."' 8 Furthermore, all of the classic
rationales for enforcing laws apply in domestic abuse cases. The interests
of standard-setting, deterrence, incapacitation, punishment and rehabili-
tation will all be fulfilled by a policy mandating the arrest of abusive
spouses. 18
9
VI. CONCLUSION
Domestic violence is a pervasive crime in our society with deeply
rooted traditions of acceptance. Violence in the home tends to be cycli-
cal and thus perpetuates itself, with children who grow up experiencing
the violence against their mothers or themselves being taught that it is
acceptable and legal. Society has a clear and pressing interest in stopping
this cycle.
Because of persistent notions that wife battering is neither inappropri-
ate nor illegal, police officers have, traditionally, used their discretionary
power to refrain from using arrest, thus remaining uninvolved and help-
ing to reinforce outdated stereotypes. Mandatory arrest laws create
guidelines for police, batterers and victims, emphasizing that battering is
a violent crime and will not be tolerated.
Jessica L. Goldman
the poor that may result from police officers making arrest determinations without sufficient guide-
lines. A. BOYLAN & N. TAUB, supra note 48, at 212.
187. See Endicott, supra note 23, at 355.
188. Inaction towards wife abuse may strengthen the belief among batterers and their victims
that society accepts spouse assault as an appropriate way to handle domestic conflicts. Mandatory
arrest laws attack these outdated assumptions and work to change the community's view of domestic
violence. This may result in a fundamental change in the behavior of many batterers. Id. at 357-58.
The institutions governing American society have not, until very recently, begun to threaten se-
vere consequences to those who beat their spouses. See supra notes 149-58 and accompanying text.
Law may influence societal norms. Endicott, supra note 23, at 358. Mandatory arrest laws and
police officers who treat battering as a crime will erode some of the stereotypes that provide the basis
for the batterers' beliefs that they behave in a socially acceptable fashion. Eppler, supra note 52, at
808.
189. Finesmith, supra note 11, at 104. Arrest may be viewed by batterers, who do not consider
themselves criminals, as something frightening. Id. Therefore, arresting batterers may be more
successful in stopping battering than arresting thieves is in preventing robbery. Most abusive men
may modify their behavior to avoid being seen as criminals.
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